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2. See M.B.  Kovera, A.W. Gresham, E. Borgida, E. Gray & P.C.
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Juror Decision Making?  A Social Cognitive Analysis, 82 J. APPLIED
PSYCHOL. 178 (1997).
3. See, e.g., David F. Ross et al., Age Stereotypes, Communication
Modality, and Mock Jurors’ Perceptions of the Child Witness, in
PERSPECTIVES ON CHILDREN’S TESTIMONY 37 (Stephen J. Ceci et al.,
eds., 1989).
4. Michelle D. Leichtman & Stephen J. Ceci, The Effects of
Stereotypes and Suggestions on Preschoolers’ Reports, 31
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 568 (1995).
I’m grateful to Dr. Martindale for introducing the reader to animportant and lively debate among practitioners and acade-mics over the relevance of recent research on children’s sug-
gestibility.  In my Cornell Law Review article,  I argued that the
recent research on suggestibility was inspired by highly coer-
cive interviewing techniques in widely publicized cases that
are not the norm in child sexual abuse investigations.  These
techniques include telling children that they have been abused,
telling children that a particular person is the abuser, and ask-
ing children to imagine details regarding how abuse could have
taken place.  Moreover, I argued that the research fails to mir-
ror factors in real-world sexual-abuse cases that reduce the
likelihood that false allegations will occur.  These factors
include the age of the child, children’s reluctance to accuse
loved ones of immoral acts, and children’s embarrassment
regarding sexual topics.  
My goal was to alert judges, attorneys, and child-abuse pro-
fessionals to the importance of carefully examining the meth-
ods used by researchers before concluding that research applies
to a particular case.  Certainly there are cases in which highly
coercive tactics have been used, and in which expert testimony
on the dangers of such tactics is justified.  But it is just as cer-
tain that the “suggestibility defense” will be overutilized. 
THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT TESTIMONY
When expert testimony on the suggestibility of children is
offered, the court must consider whether the research the
expert will discuss sufficiently fits the facts of the case to be
helpful to the jury.1 Jurors are likely to be influenced by expert
testimony even if it fails to fit the facts of the case, in part
because they are less adept at detecting a lack of fit, and in part
because they naturally assume that an expert testifying for the
defense is sympathetic to the defense.2 Moreover, unlike cases
involving adult eyewitnesses, most jurors come to court ready
to doubt the reliability of a child witness.3
The need for screening potentially unhelpful and prejudi-
cial expert testimony is accentuated when an expert knows lit-
tle about the case in which he or she is testifying.  As Dr.
Martindale notes, experts routinely testify without familiariz-
ing themselves with case-specific details, in order to retain
objectivity.  Moreover, experts will almost inevitably make
claims on the stand that they would be hesitant to make were
their words subject to peer review and publication: as Dr.
Martindale argues,  “an analysis of an expert’s testimony pro-
vides more information about the expert’s performance under
pressure than it does about the expert’s findings.”  The judge
must therefore scrutinize the applicability of the expert’s find-
ings before the expert is allowed to take the stand. If the expert
is allowed to testify, the court should limit his or her discus-
sion to research that applies to the case at bar. 
WHAT ARE THE RESEARCH FINDINGS?
Dr. Martindale defends the applicability of the research to
real-world abuse cases and the relevance of expert testimony
on suggestibility without describing any of the research itself.
In the hands of a less conscientious expert than Dr. Martindale,
this argument can lead to mischief. Testifying experts will
often make blanket claims about the unreliability of children,
or report the results of research without describing the
methodology or the potential limits of the research’s applica-
bility to the real world. 
Let’s consider one of the most oft-cited studies demonstrat-
ing the suggestibility of children—the Sam Stone study, which
was published in Developmental Psychology, a peer-reviewed
scientific journal of the American Psychological Association.4
The study showed that a combination of suggestive interview-
ing techniques led 72% of younger children to assert falsely
that a stranger named Sam Stone had come to their preschool
and committed various misdeeds.  Children often embellished
their false stories with perceptual details and nonverbal ges-
tures, making their reports highly credible.  Experts often cite
the study as evidence that children can be led to make false yet
highly convincing allegations of sexual abuse.
Closer examination reveals the lengths to which the
researchers worked to obtain false reports, and the extent to
which false allegations of sexual abuse are less likely in the real
world.  One of the suggestive techniques the researchers used
was “stereotype induction,” which they analogized to negative
statements that adults might make about an ex-spouse.
Research assistants visited each child on four consecutive
weeks before Sam Stone came to the preschool, and provided
the child with details of 12 different misdeeds that the assis-
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the room?” to “Is the door open in the cabinet in the room?”).
tants had purportedly witnessed Sam perform.  Sam Stone’s
visit was two minutes long, and he did not interact with indi-
vidual children. Another suggestive technique the researchers
used was suggestive questioning.  For four weeks after Sam’s
visit, an interviewer questioned each child each week.  In the
first interview, the interviewer showed the child a soiled teddy
bear and a ripped book and asked the child to speculate who
might have done it. In the next three interviews the inter-
viewer asked a series of highly suggestive questions.  These
questions presupposed that Sam Stone had ripped the book or
soiled the teddy bear, did not give the child an opportunity to
deny that he had done so, and asked the child to choose among
details of the fictitious events.  For example, “Did Sam Stone
rip the book with his hands, or did he use scissors?” “When
Sam Stone got the bear dirty, did he do it by accident, or on
purpose?” These questions were asked regardless of whether
the child affirmed or denied that Sam Stone had performed any
misdeeds.  Ten weeks later, all children were interviewed in a
nonleading fashion.  At that time, 72% of the three and four
year olds implicated Sam in one or both misdeeds.
The high rates of false reports are impressive.  But equally
impressive are other details of the study that are often over-
looked.  First, the authors report “dramatic developmental
trends” in children’s susceptibility to the suggestive tech-
niques.5 The rate of false reports among the older preschool-
ers, who were five to six years of age, was about half of that of
the younger children. School-age children would be even less
likely to succumb to the interviewer’s pressures. One of the
most consistent findings in the suggestibility literature is that
preschool children are particularly vulnerable to suggestive
questioning, and preschool children predominate in recent
research documenting the unreliability of children’s testimony.
Second, the study was unusual in that the final interview
contained two questions mildly skeptical of the children’s
claims.  Asking children if they saw the events reduced the
number of false reports by about half.  Asking the children,
“You didn’t really see him rip the book (or soil the bear), did
you?” cut the number by half again.  Having been exposed to
four trials of stereotype induction and three trials of suggestive
questioning, 21% of the three and four year olds (and only 5%
of the five and six year olds) maintained that the misdeeds had
occurred.
Dr. Martindale might respond that he is not reassured by
these numbers, and I would agree that any false allegation of
sexual abuse is devastating, not only for the accused, but also
for the child and his or her family.  Yet these percentages exag-
gerate the likelihood that a child will accuse a familiar adult of
sexual abuse, compared to
the likelihood that a child
will accuse a stranger of
ripping a book or soiling a
teddy bear.  How close the
numbers get to zero is any-
body’s guess.  
The Sam Stone study
illustrates a number of
important facts about sug-
gestibility research.  First,
there are large age differ-
ences in suggestibility.  I am struck by how many experts appear
to overlook the truism that just as preschoolers are much more
suggestible than school-age children, school-age children are
much less suggestible than preschoolers.  Second, children are
both suggestible and counter-suggestible.  Researchers often fail
to test the persistence of their suggestions; Sam Stone is an
exception, and dramatically reduced the number of false reports.
Third, much of the suggestibility research elicits false narratives
from young children by telling them that the events occurred (as
opposed to merely asking them), and by providing them with
details with which they can imagine the events.  Indeed, these
are the techniques researchers have used to create substantial
numbers of false childhood memories in adults.   But the issue
is not whether children can be led to make false allegations, but
whether they are being led by current investigative methods. 
WHAT SORT OF INTERVIEWS ARE OCCURRING IN THE
REAL WORLD?
Leichtman and Ceci asserted that the techniques in the Sam
Stone study were based on “real-world forensic conditions.”6
In my 1999 paper, I questioned the applicability of the Sam
Stone study and other studies to the real world, pointing out
that the research on actual interviews had not documented the
widespread use of techniques such as stereotype induction.
What had been documented was that interviewers were asking
very few open-ended questions, and relying heavily on closed-
ended questions (yes-no questions and forced-choice ques-
tions).7 Closed-ended questions are often considered “lead-
ing,” and I believe they are being overused.  In my presenta-
tions to child interviewers, I emphasize the need for structured
interview protocols and the potential benefits of rapport build-
ing and greater use of open-ended questions as means of
increasing information without reducing reliability.  All the
same, closed-ended questions  are far less leading than the
kind of questions asked in studies like Sam Stone.8 They are
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less offensive than many of the techniques documented in the
notorious day-care cases like Kelly Michaels and the McMartin
case.  Closed-ended questions are also necessary in some
cases.9 Abused children are often quite reluctant to describe
abuse that was painful, shameful, and embarrassing.10
After my article appeared, Amye Warren and her colleagues
set out to test my claims on a sample of 42 child abuse inter-
views conducted in the late 1980s and early 1990s.   Their con-
clusion? “We believe that our results regarding the frequency of
problematic techniques in ‘typical’ child sexual abuse inter-
views are encouraging.  It appears that the assumptions made
by Lyon (1999) about the rarity of some of the most egregious
interviewing practices (e.g. referring to what other people have
said) in ‘typical’ interviews may be well-founded.”11 The
authors issued several caveats: the interviews might not be rep-
resentative of all interviews, and the researchers might have
both missed some suggestive techniques, and counted some
harmless interactions as suggestive.12 Most importantly, the
authors stressed that the infrequent use of improper techniques
does not make an interview a good interview.  Nevertheless, the
study supported my basic assertion: studies like Sam Stone
exaggerate the suggestiveness of real-world interviews.
In response to the relative infrequency of the highly sugges-
tive techniques favored by suggestibility researchers, Dr.
Martindale argues that the “deleterious effect of one strong
suggestion from an authoritative source is not likely to be
diminished simply because it is followed by numerous non-
suggestive questions.”  I know of no research to support this
assertion, and Dr. Martindale does not offer any.  The recent
research on preschool children’s suggestibility does not stop
with “one strong suggestion.”  It is the dogged persistence of
coercive interviewers that reliably produces false narratives in
young children.  The cases that inspired the research involved
unrelenting suggestion over long periods of time by interview-
ers utterly convinced that abuse had occurred.  The mistakes
committed by investigative interviewers in less sensational
cases tend to be much more mundane.  
We clearly need to improve the quality of interviewing: we
should provide more training, more supervision, and more
resources.    But the liberal receipt of expert testimony on the
effects of highly suggestive interviewing techniques on
preschool children is more likely to simply increase the num-
ber of acquittals across the board than to improve interviewing
practice.
CONCLUSION
I agree with Dr. Martindale that the recent research on chil-
dren’s suggestibility has done a lot of good.  It has spawned
several research programs aimed at improving the process by
which children are interviewed about abuse.  In appropriate
cases, it can educate judges and jurors about the dangers of
highly suggestive interviewing with young children. It has
largely silenced extremist claims that children’s abuse allega-
tions are never false or that children are no more suggestible
than adults. 
However, we must not forget that the extremist claims were
founded on overgenerous interpretations of research finding
surprisingly low rates of false reports among young children.
Research highlighting high rates of error can easily lead to sim-
ilarly unfounded claims about children’s reliability.   These
claims, in turn, can reinforce commonsense doubts about chil-
dren’s reliability and inherent reluctance to confront child sex-
ual abuse.  
The solution is quite straightforward: judges must take care
to assess the applicability of suggestibility research on a case-
by-case basis.  Experts seeking to testify must describe the
research with sufficient specificity to allow the court to assess
whether the research fits the fact of the case.  If it doesn’t fit,
you don’t admit.  Similarly, suggestibility research offered for
other purposes (such as for assessing the reliability of hearsay)
should be scrutinized with similar care.  Judges should keep in
mind the importance of the child’s age, the suggestive influ-
ences at issue, and the relationship of the child to the alleged
offender.  Through judicious gatekeeping, extremist claims
about suggestibility can be kept out of the courtroom.
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